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CREDIT RATING AGENCIES & FREE SPEECH
by
Alka Bramhandkar*
Marlene Barken**
Gwen Seaquist***

°

INTRODUCTION
The economic crisis that emerged in late 2007 continues to
occupy an important place in many political and non-political
discussions and can be traced to a number of players. The role
many financial institutions, mortgage brokers, appraisers, and
speculators played is well documented. Individual borrowers
also contributed to this sub-prime lending crisis either
knowingly or unwittingly through participation in the fraud
committed by other parties. Several experts have put the blame
squarely on the politicians who promoted home-ownership as
the ultimate measure of success in American society and the
government agencies (e.g. Fannie Mae) that were charged with
assisting in the process of making these home ownership
dreams come true.
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Even the most respected Federal Reserve ex-Chairman, Alan
Greenspan, has not escaped criticism on account of his policy
of keeping interest rates low for a long time. Recently, some
investors and economists have pointed to the pivotal part credit
rating agencies played in the meltdown. This paper will
examine that role, focusing on whether credit rating agencies
should be able to avoid liability by virtue of their traditional
protection under the First Amendment, and whether new
regulatory reforms designed to curtail conflicts of interest and
promote greater disclosure will suffice.
WHAT ARE CREDIT RATINGS & WHY ARE THEY
IMPORTANT?
The easiest way to understand credit ratings is to compare
them to the grade point averages (GPA) given out by most
schools. Earning a GP A of "A" is excellent whereas receiving
a GP A of "D" is bad. Each of the major rating agencies have
their own categories akin to the As and Bs a student gets in
his/her coursework. For example, Standard & Poor' s (S & P)
gives the highest rating of AAA for a debt issuer with stellar
financial performance. A rating of "B" is given to an issuer
whose debt issue servicing may be considered speculative.
Moody's follows a similar method with Triple A (Aaa) as the
best possible rating and a rating of "B 1" indicating
questionable ability of the borrower to pay interest and
principal on the debt in a timely manner.
These ratings are usually paid for by the issuers instead of
by the investors of debt. Scannell & Lucchetti report in their
2008 article that about 98 percent of the ratings are paid for by
1
the issuers. Some issuers routinely shop around for a better
rating. A high rating can translate into lower interest rate and
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significant savings over the life of the debt issue. Acceptable
ratings can also lead to a larger pool of investors w.ho
interested in buying these bonds, thereby creatmg a hqmd
secondary market. It is not uncommon for the debt issuer to
with a
buy additional insurance to make its debt
credit rating more acceptable for the prospective mvestors.
Investors rely on these ratings to get an objective
assessment of the debt's quality. Some debt investors who are
regulated are prohibited from investing in non-investment
grade bonds. "The Federal Reserve defines investment-grade
securities as those rated BBB- or higher by at least one of the
three principal credit ratings agencies and no lower
that by
the others." 3 For banks choosing to invest in non-mvestmentgrade bonds, the penalty comes in the form of higher
ratios. Prior to the creation of the new derivative products hke
the Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs) and Collateralized
Mortgage Obligations (CMOs), assigning a rating to a bond
issue was a relatively simple process.
In a traditional credit analysis, the ratings agencies focus on
the four major C's of credit. The four C's refer to: capacity,
collateral, covenants, and character. The questions about
"Capacity" revolve around the issuer's ability to pay
the
of
debt as promised. The ratings analyst may look at a
financial and nonfinancial information about the Issumg
company. Rating agencies examine the historical financial
statements , calculate relevant traditional and cash flow
. based
.
ratios, and compare the issuer's performance over tlme to tts
peers, and to the industry in which the issuer operates. In
addition, qualitative judgment is used to evaluate
factors which could affect a company's ability to servtce Its
debt such as the trends in the industry in which the company
any relevant
operates, its competi.tive
factors which could Impact Its operations. The second C m
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the analysis, namely collateral, is based on the examination of
the creditors' rights in the event the issuer goes bankrupt or
files for a reorganization plan. A study of "Covenants" focuses
on any limitations that may be imposed on the borrower's
activities. The last "C" refers to the character of the borrower.
This part of the evaluation is based on the qualitative judgment
of the company's management. A range of factors such as the
ownership structure, shareholder rights, public disclosure, and
the structure of the board may be used to assign a character
4
score to the issuer.
Ratings have been used by regulators since the thirties, but
in the seventies, the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC)
gave them new power. There are ten Nationally Recognized
Statistical Rating Organizations (NRSROs), including the big
three, Standard and Poor's (S&P), Moody's and Fitch. Their
role is to channel funds into supposedly safe and secure
investments. Issuers must obtain a rating, which in turn
dictates where banks, insurance companies, money-market
funds and the like can place their money. While these
regulatory requirements were intended to protect investors, the
net effect was to turn the "opinion" rating agencies into
essential gatekeepers. 5 Then in the late 1990s, the role of
rating agencies underwent a significant change as the newly
created derivative products were introduced.
THE NATURE OF DERIVATIVE PRODUCTS AND THE
RATINGS GAME
Mortgage-backed securities (also known as CMOs) come
into existence when a financial institution puts many of the
mortgages they own or bought into an investment pool. These
pools are sometimes sliced and diced into different classes of
securities with varying levels of risk and return. The risk
levels, for example, may be based on the probabilities of
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default and which class of investors would bear the first x
percent of the default. One of the major advantages of
securitizations is creation of liquidity which allowed lenders to
keep giving out loans after selling the loans
on their
books. It was believed that these securities were quite safe as
they were backed by several thousand loans and the proba_bility
that all these loans could simultaneously default was shrn to
none.
The ratings given to these CMOs were necessary. for _the
financial institutions to be able to sell them to orgamzat10ns
on the
like pension funds and banks which had
securities in which they could invest. As descnbed below, the
ratings "game" now being played was quite different from the
ratings that agencies previously had issued for bonds of
companies like Enron.
For traditional bond issues, the focus is placed on the
borrowers' ability to run their business and generate cash flows
to pay the interest and principal to the debt investors. A!l
financial information needed to calculate the relevant ratios IS
retrieved from the company's audited financial statements. A
publicly traded company is required to _hire an independent
audit firm which certifies that the financial statements follow
the Generally Accepted Financial Principles
and
accurately depict what a firm owes and owns on Its balance
sheet. The audited income statement looks at the revenue and
expense recognition standards followed by the company and
produces net income after tax generated by the company over a
12 month time period. The credit rating agencies
tremendous criticism for holding on to the best posstble tnple
A ratings for Enron bonds just prior to Enron declaring
bankruptcy. At that time, ratings agencies claimed that they
should not bear any blame because companies like Eru:on were
engaged in fraudulent bookkeeping with total cooperation from
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their auditors. The "cooked" financial statements painted a
significantly better financial picture of Enron compared to the
reality. Enron's management, with help from its auditors, had
created thousands of Special Purpose Entities (SPEs) whose
sole purpose was to take the debt off Enron's balance sheet.
The ratings agencies relied heavily on the "window dressed"
financial statements certified by the company's auditors, and
they successfully defended themselves in court, arguing that
they had no reason to independently investigate if Enron had
taken deliberate steps to hide debt from its balance sheet. 6
The ratings assigned to derivative products like the CMOs
could not be figured out using the same technique. These
securities were backed by thousands of mortgages spread over
many geographic locations and borrowers. It was next to
impossible to verify the details of each and every mortgage.
The practice of continuously slicing and dicing the bundled
securities to create more securities exacerbated this problem
even more as one mortgage debt might now be backing more
than a couple of CMO's. The rating agencies had to get their
information from the investment banks that created the pooled
securities. The rating agencies also assumed, erroneously, that
housing prices would continue their upward movement
indefinitely, minimizing the chance of even subprime
borrowers defaulting on their loans.
Another significant difference between the processes used
for assigning ratings to traditional corporate bonds versus the
ratings assigned to structured products lies in the differences in
the customer base for these products. The ratings agencies
have a lot more control over ratings for bonds as they have
many clients with no single client providing a significant
source of revenue. On the other hand, derivative securities
were put together by only a handful of investment banks whose
loss as clients would mean a huge loss of revenue to the ratings
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agencies.
This concentration of clients put tremendous
pressure on ratings agencies to assign favorable ratings to some
7
structured products to please their clients.
Investors who relied on these ratings are now seeking to
hold the rating agencies responsible for the losses generated by
these CMOs & COOs as the real estate market all over the
world went into a freefall leading to simultaneous defaults on
ln the past, ratings agencies have
thousands of loans.
successfully argued that their opinions are not actionable and
are analogous to that of a stock analyst who issues buy or sell
recommendations.
Moreover, the worldwide economic
conditions are completely unprecedented. Interestingly, legal
counsel representing Fitch in its testimony to Congress, called
ratings the "World's Shortest Editorial" and claimed that first
.
.
.
8
amendment protectiOn I S appropnate.
Nonetheless, plaintiffs are aggressively pursuing fraud and
liability theories that question both the traditional First
Amendment protection enjoyed by the rating agencies and their
government-sanctioned role in "certifying" the safety of the
securities they rated. The SEC is likewise moving to curb the
conflicts of interest that led to ratings shopping and inflated
assessments.
ARE CREDIT RATING AGENCIES ENTITLED TO FIRST
AMENDMENT PROTECTION?

A. Are Credit Rating Agencies Journalists?
The process of news gathering is a protected right under the
First Amendment, albeit a qualified one. This qualified right,
which results in the journalist's privilege, emanates from the
strong public policy supporting the unfettered communication
of information by journalists to the public. Ratings put forth by
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a credit rating agency may qualify as newsgathering under
certain circumstances. This is true if the information provided
by the credit agency is a matter of public concern and is
opinion, not factual. 9
Statements of fact may be proven, and if false, are subject
to defamation or fraud claims, whereas statements of opinion
are not provable ... "a statement of opinion relating to matters
of public concern which does not contain a provably false
factual
connotation will receive full
constitutional
protection." 10 As stated in the Enron case, "In other words, if a
statement "cannot reasonably [be] interpreted as stating actual
facts," it is shielded by the First Amendment. 11 As factors to
consider in the determination of whether a statement can
reasonably be interpreted as one of fact, the court may examine
the language employed, e.g., whether it is "loose, figurative, or
hyperbolic language which would negate the impression" that
it was a statement of fact, as well as the context of the
statement and the "general tenor of the article." 12

B. Matter ofPublic or Private Concern?
The information provided by the credit rating agency must
be of public concern in order to receive protection. For
example in the Enron case, the court pointed out that "The
sheer size of the ... litigation, not to mention the numerous
related criminal actions, attests to the public import of Enron
13
and its sudden collapse in 2001." The court went on to say
"that while there is no automatic, blanket, absolute First
Amendment protection for reports from the credit rating
agencies based on their status as credit rating agencies, the
courts generally have shielded them from liability for allegedly
negligent ratings for various reasons." 14
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On the other hand, if the matter is one of private rather than
public concern, then the court will not protect the credit rating
agency. In Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders,
Inc. 15 , D&B prepared a credit report concerning Greenmoss
Builders that contained the erroneous information that
Greenmoss had filed for bankruptcy, when in fact it had not.
Upon learning of the error, D&B sent a correction to the five
creditors who had received the report, but Greenmoss was not
satisfied and sued for libel. In one of the few decisions to so
hold, the U.S. Supreme Court emphasized that " ' [w]hether ...
speech addresses a matter of public concern must be
determined by [the expression's] content, form, and context ...
16
as revealed by the whole record."' Here, the Supreme Court
found that the credit report of a private construction contractor
was not entitled to First Amendment protection because it
concerned "no public issue, ... [but] was speech solely in the
interest of the speaker and its specific business audience," since
it concerned solely a private plaintiff and was sent to only five
subscribers who were under agreement to keep the information
confidential. 17 Therefore the report did not involve any "strong
interest in the free flow of commercial information" that would
"ensure that 'debate on public issues [will] be uninhibited,
'd
,,(g
ro bust, an d wt e-open.
Similarll, in the case In re Nat'! Century Fi.n. Enters..
Jnv. Litig., 1 the plaintiffs sued Moody's and Fttch for gtvmg
National Century notes their highest credit ratings, which the
plaintiffs claimed they relied on to purchase the notes. National
Century subsequently went bankrupt. The Court found that the
notes in question were issued by a privately-held company and
"targeted to a select class of institutional investors with the
resources to invest tens of millions of dollars in the notes. And
the only place that the ratings are alleged to have appeared
were in the offering materials given to the select class of
investors." 20 Since the ratings were not published to the
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investing public at large, Moody's and Fitch were denied First
Amendment protection.
If the information gathered by the credit agency is not
disseminated to the public, but is published for example, on a
website, it may not be "public" information. This was the case
in American Savings Bank, FSB v. UBS PaineWebbe/ 1 holding
that no journalistic privilege applied. Here, Paine Webber made
investment recommendations to American Savings Bank,
based on information that PaineWebber received from Fitch.
The matter before the court involved discovery of information
provided by Fitch, for which Fitch claimed a journalistic
privilege. The court found two factors significant. First,
Fitch's primary means of disseminating information to both its
subscribers and the public was on its website; and secondly,
Fitch performed its ratings based on a private, contractual
agreement for a fee. Finding that Fitch rarely performed its
services without a fee, the court held that "research conducted
for a fee cannot be joumalism." 22 In an ancillary case the
Second Circuit also held that Fitch was not entitled to a
journalistic privilege because, unlike a business newspaper or
magazine, which would cover any transactions deemed
newsworthy, Fitch only " covers" its own clients. "We believe
this practice weighs against treating Fitch as a journalist. This
practice, of course, contrasts noticeably with Standard & Poor's
practice (as described in Pan Am) of rating nearly all public
debt issuances regardless of whether it was hired to do so or
not."23
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a review, he is clearly expressing his opinion. However, if the
critic was actually involved in the preparation of the meal in
5
the kitchen then he is not just writing his opinion? In the case
of ratings assigned to derivative products, the rating agencies
were actually present in the board rooms of investment banks
engaged in bundling these securities. Given that vested
interest, plaintiffs argue that the rating agencies should lose the
protection associated with free speech.
Many angry investors also claim that the ratings are
actually products and when these products were consumed
(relied upon) by investors they were hurt. As such, rating
agencies could be sued on the grounds of selling a defective
product much like a manufacture of a toaster that bursts into
flames. Indeed, the analysts themselves were unsure about the
rating process and the models they were using to come up with
26
It was revealed m
.
ratings for the structured products.
Congressional hearings that the debt analysts may have failed
to recognize the higher level of risk associated with these
derivative products and were engaged in giving out ratings to
any issuer who paid for them. 27 As the real estate bubble grew,
Moody's, Fitch and S&P doubled their revenues from $3
28
billion in 2002 to $6 billion in 2007. One recent complaint
filed against the big three alleges that they '"failed to conduct
due diligence and willingly assigned the highest ratings to
.. .impaired instruments since they received substantial fees
from the issuers "' and that this "cozy relationship" resulted in
'
.
29
inflated ratings based on an outdated ratmg methodology.

C. Can Rating Agencies Claim First Amendment Protection
When They Helped to Create the Product They Rated?

D. Applying the First Amendment Shield

David Grace, a noted securities lawyer, made an illustrative
24
comparison between rating agencies and a restaurant critic. If
a critic merely goes to a restaurant, eats a meal and then writes

Still reeling from the subprime implosion, government and
private investors are testing the extent of the First Amendment
protection. In the pending case of Abu Dhabi Commercial
Bank v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 30 institutional investors King
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County, Washington and Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank
brought a class action to recover losses stemming from a
liquidation of notes issued by a structured investment vehicle.
The eight defendants include S&P and Moody's. The rating
agencies claimed in their motion for summary judgment that
they are entitled to immunity under the First Amendment, but
the court disagreed. Noting that under " typical" circumstances
the First Amendment normally protects rating agencies subject
to an "actual malice" exception, the court relied on the
Greenmoss and National Century cases (supra), stating that
"where a rating agency has disseminated their ratings to a
select group of investors rather than to the public at large, the
31
rating agency is not afforded the same protection. " The court
also rejected the defendants' argument that their ratings were
opinions. The judge found that the plaintiffs had sufficiently
alleged that the rating agencies did not genuinely or reasonably
believe the ratings they assigned to the rated notes to be
accurate or to have a basis in fact. "As a result, the Rating
Agencies' ratings were not mere opinions but rather actionable
32
misrepresentations."
For the same reasons, the defendants'
disclaimers that "(a) credit rating represents a Rating Agency's
opinion regarding credit quality and is not a guarantee of
performance or a recommendation to buy, sell or hold any
securities," were deemed unavailing to protect the defendants
from liability for promulgating misleading ratings. 33
CONGRESSIONAL AND SEC RESPONSES
In addition to First Amendment protection, ratings agencies
also have been shielded from liability for everything except
34
fraud under federal securities law. In 2006, Congress passed
the Credit Rating Reform Act (CRARA), pursuant to which the
SEC liberalized the ground rules whereby a credit rating
agency can become an NRSRO. Although that act achieved its
goal of expanding the number of NRSROs, it did nothing to
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prevent the inflated ratings so intertwined with the financial
meltdown. 35 Nor did it significantly increase competition, as
Moody's, Fitch and S&P still maintain an 85% mar_ket
Relatively weak new rules were enacted, but they sttll did not
. . c
h"Ire" probl em. 36
tackle the "cnttc-10rThe SEC's new rules were released in the Federal Register
37
on November 23, 2009, and went into effect in June, 2010.
When an issuer, underwriter or other offering participant uses a
credit rating to market its securities, more credit ratings history
and disclosure are required in the prospectus and registration
statements.
Disclosure must include general information
of
regarding the scope of the credit rating,
interest (such as other services and fees paid to the credit ratmg
agency), and all preliminary or final credit ratings obtained
from other credit rating agencies for the same class of
securities. The last requirement is designed to help investors
38
identify potential instances of ratings shopping. The SEC has
deferred, however, consideration of a rule that would have
required NRSROs to report the ratings methodologies and
particular credit risk characteristics for structured finance
products. 39
Under CRARA, the substance of credit ratings and the
procedure and methodologies by which NRSROs
those ratings were protected from SEC and state regulation,
though there was a narrow exception for state actions brought
on tort grounds. The federal preemption defense may come
into play as state attorneys general seek redress in the
foreclosure crisis. For example, in 2008, Connecticut attorney
general Richard Blumenthal filed suit against the credit rating
agencies on a fraud theory, alleging violation of Connecticut's
40
Unfair Trade Practices Act.
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Pressure to enact stiffer regulations intensified in the
months leading up to the passage of the sweeping Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, signed into law July of
41
2010 (Financial Reform Act). In December of2009, the SEC
had announced that it was considering rescinding Rule 436(g)
which insulated NRSROs from potential liability under Section
11 of the Securities Act for material misstatements or
42
omissions in a registration statement. The Financial Reform
43
Act eliminated the exemption. NRSROs and other credit
rating agencies will now be on an equal footing. Companies
that include a credit rating in their registration statement will
need to obtain the consent of the rating agency for the use of its
name in the prospectus, in the same manner as consent is
required from auditors. The rationale is clear: when ratings
are used to sell securities, investors rely on NRSROs as
experts, and they should be subject to the same liability as are
other experts, such as auditors. Rescission of Rule 436(g)
should cause rating agencies to improve the quality of their
ratings and analysis in order to reduce their risk ofliability. 44

verification of the factual elements relied on to evaluate credit
risk. 46

The Financial Reform Act embraces many of the provisions
that were included in related House and Senate Bills introduced
in 2009. 45 The Rating Accountability and Transparency
Enhancement Act (the RATE Act), incorporated under Title V,
Subtitle B, of the Financial Reform Act, requires the SEC to
review credit ratings and methodologies employed by
NRSROs. It also directs the SEC to create and enforce rules to
prohibit, or manage and disclose conflicts of interest, as well as
to establish a compliance office. A critical component of the
RATE Act is to modify the scienter requirement in a private
action for monetary damages against an NRSRO. It will be
sufficient for plaintiffs to state with particularity acts giving
rise to a strong inference that the NRSRO knowingly or
recklessly failed either to conduct a reasonable investigation of
the rated security or to obtain reasonable, independent

ARE THE PROBLEMS BETTER LEFT IN THE INVISIBLE
HANDS OF THE FREE MARKET?

Congress also directed the SEC to study and report within a
year on ( 1) a system that assigns NRSROs on a rotating basis
to issuers seeking a credit rating; (2) the effect of new
requirements on NRSRO registration; (3)
of
different classes of bonds; (4) meaningful multldtgtt ratmgs
system; and (5) ratings standardization. The Comptroller
General must likewise study and report to Congress on the
implementation of the RATE Act, including (1) the
appropriateness of relying on ratings for use in federal, state,
and local securities and banking regulations, as well as for
determining capital requirements; (2) the effect of liability in
private actions due to rescission of Rule 436(g); (3) alternative
means for compensating credit rating agencies that would
create incentives for accurate credit ratings ; and (4) alternative
to assess credit risk, including market-based
measures.

One of the solutions proposed to address this crisis was to
do nothing and leave it to market forces to assign a value to the
work done by the raters. Not surprisingly, one of the strongest
supporters of this solution has been Deven Sharma, President
of S & p .48 He argued that the NRSRO ratings were
interpreted by some investors as a "government seal of
approval" instead of using them as on_e
of
information they could use to assess nsk. If mvestor ratmg
requirements are removed, newer ratings agencies can enter the
market facilitating appropriate flow of capital through the debt
ratings.
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There is no broad support for such as argument. If history
has taught us anything it is that:

•
•

•

•

Ratings agencies will continue to have conflicts of
interest and analysts will get "routinely bullied" by the
companies paying for such ratings. 49
a handful of rating agencies have been dominating
the mdustry for several decades and without proper
reforms there is no room for any new small agency to
enter the industry.
Some experts believe that imposing explicit disclosure
requirements may force the agencies to take their debt
ratings more seriously. If the disclosure rules pertain to
historical facts such as the relationship between the
ratings and the actual defaults, this type of information
could be fairly easy to file with no major resistance
from the agencies. However, if the rules require the
agencies to disclose immediately information such as
the data & the proprietary methodology used, the raters
may be reluctant to comply with the rules as they may
not be able to make any money for the ratings. Any
disclosure rules imposed on the ratings agencies would
necessarily require a reasonable time frame during
which the agencies need to complete the necessary
50
Such a lag in time would defeat the
paperwork.
purpose of extra disclosure as the investors would have
made their decision based on the assigned
ratmgs.
Requiring additional labels (e.g. S for structured
products) may not be helpful, especially if in the future
any products are introduced by the investment banks

51

under new non-derivative sounding names.
Usually
rules and regulations lag significantly behind the new
changes taking place in the marketplace and do not win
at the catch-up game.
In other words, the only viable change that may effectively
protect investors is to give them the power to sue the raters
under expanded theories of liability.
CONCLUSION
Unlike Enron, where the ratings agencies had no reason to
know that the company's managers and auditors were engaged
in systematic fraud and manipulation of the company' s balance
sheet, in the instant cases, the rating agencies were actively
involved in structuring the very products they rated. States,
institutional and private investors alike were caught in the
subprime implosion. The rating agencies should not be
allowed to hide behind either the First Amendment or their
government-sanctioned status as NRSROs. Courts should hold
these agencies responsible for their misrepresentations, and
Congress has appropriately responded with strong new
regulation and expanded liability for private actions under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Rating agencies should be
treated as experts and held to the same standard as auditors.
The SEC's and Comptroller General' s reports to Congress next
year on implementation of the RATE Act will be critical in
assessing what further steps should be taken to regulate the
credit rating system as part of the larger agenda of achieving
true financial reform.
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IRS PRESSES FOR TRANSPARENCY
ON TAX ACCRUALS

By
Martin H. Zern *

The art of taxation consists in so plucking the goose as to
procure the greatest quantity offeathers with the least possible
amount of hissing.
- JEAN-BAPTISTE COLBERT
I. INTRODUCTION

Recently, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) announced
that corporations and businesses generally will be required to
reflect on their tax returns any tax position that is considered
inconsistent with Financial Accounting Standard Board
(F ASB) Interpretation No. 48, Accounting for Uncertainty in
1
Income Taxes, or similar financial reporting standards. To this
end, the IRS has developed a new form (Form 1120 Schedule
UTP) that will have to be filed annually by some corporations?
Clearly, the IRS is seeking more transparency from
corporations and businesses in general regarding their tax
planning ventures, which some may categorize as tax evasion
schemes or even scams. No doubt the government's stance is
attributable to its need for more revenue and the overall tone of
hostility by much of the general public to large corporations in
light of the recent - and perhaps continuing - financial crisis.
Many believe that corporations are unfairly reducing their tax
liability by utilization of aggressive corporate tax shelters that
often have no purpose other than tax reduction.

